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THE REFERENDUM PROCESS IN THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES
ROBERT E. MARTIN
Department of Government, Howard University
For well over a decade the Federal Government
of the United States has been utilizing popular
referendums among farmers as a basic element in
the determination of national agricultural policy.
The heart of the agricultural adjustment program
was made dependent upon the favorable public
opinion of the Nation’s agrarian interests, as ascer
tained through periodic voting. These referendums
provide an interesting and dramatic study in public
administration and agricultural democracy. This
program also poses some far-reaching questions
which must be answered, especially for whenever
we seem to be entering periods of price-depressing
crop surpluses. With the experience of the last
several years, we are in a position to analyze this
use of the referendum process.1
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 made
provisions for marketing quotas to be effective
whenever supplies of certain commodities exceeded
normal. When the quantities needed for market
requirements, reserves, and carry-overs were ex
ceeded by amounts specified for cotton, wheat,
corn, tobacco, and rice, a referendum of producers
was to be held.2 The referendum was to determine
whether quotas should be fixed for the product in
question, with penalties applied to sales in excess
of each producer’s quota. These quotas were to
apply only in the event that at least two-thirds of
the crop growers approved. An early study of the
1As farm owners, tenants, and sharecroppers—Ne
gro and white—were eligible to vote in the AAA mar
keting quota referendums, the program provided broad
experiences in class and race relationships of consider
able interest and importance, especially for the South.
The extent and significance of Negro-white participa
tion in this program was studied by the writer during
a year in the field on a grant from the Social Science
Research Council. The findings were presented as his
doctoral dissertation with the title, Negro-White Parti
cipation in the A. A. A. Cotton and Tobacco Referenda
in North and South Carolina, accepted by the Depart
ment of Political Science of the University of Chicago
in August 1947.
2 U. S. Agricultural Adjustment Administration,
Rides and Regulations of Agricultural Adjustment Ad
ministration (Washington, 1939), 79-83.

adjustment program delineated the considerable
significance of this referendum process in the fol
lowing statement: “An important device developed
as a means of preserving the voluntary character
of adjustment undertakings and of serving as a
check on propaganda was the use of referenda of
producers.”3
Provisions for the referendums in the AAA pro
gram represented not only a new use of this
instrument but also a definite departure from tra
ditional federal legislative procedure. A brief con
sideration of the meaning, origin, and use of the
device will serve to highlight the significance of
its adoption in the legislative policy of the Agri
cultural Adjustment Act. Essentially a referendum
is a vote, by the eligible voters of a given geo
graphic area, on a legislative measure or policy
which is submitted to them for their approval or
rejection. Like so many other ideas, the concept of
the referendum seems to have had its origin in
the limited democracies of the ancient Greeks.4
This instrument has also been in use among the
Swiss for many centuries. Beginning in ancient
times, it is still utilized in the cantons of the
Swiss republic.
The modern use of the referendum seems to
have come along with the liberalization of political
institutions and public dissatisfaction with some of
the early fruits of representative government.5
Democratization of government did not bring all
of the improvements in political life that were
3Edwin G. Nourse, Joseph S. Davis, and John D.
Black, Three Years of the Agricultural Adjustment Ad
ministration (Washington, 1937), 273.
4 “All ancient democracy was direct democracy. In
the Greek city-states all legislation was initiated by
the people and authorized by direct popular vote with
out the intervention of representatives.” William B.
Munro, “Initiative and Referendum,” Encyclopaedia
of the Social Sciences, 8: 51 (New York, 1934).
5According to Herman Finer, Theory and Practice
of Modern Government (rev. ed., New York, 1949),
560, an examination of the initiative and referendum
shows “that their merits are built upon real or pre
sumed deficiencies in modem parliamentary systems.”
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hoped for, and so the people resorted to further
reform by providing additional popular checks.
Development of the modern press and rise of
aggressive interest groups have progressively re
duced the representative nature of representative
assemblies, an inevitable result of which has been
the increasing demands for direct popular action.6
Although the referendum is often referred to as
one of the “democratic innovations” of the “New
Democracy” in the United States after 1900, it is,
in reality, one of our oldest native political insti
tutions. I t was introduced and came into periodic
use prior to the adoption of the earliest American
State constitutions and has been required in the
constitutional amendment process by almost all of
the States since that time. However, as a mecha
nism of popular government in the process of
ordinary lawmaking, the referendum is a relatively
recent development in the United States. After
being used occasionally in some of the States
during the latter part of the nineteenth century,
the referendum came into wide popularity after
1900. I t was one of the methods resorted to during
the period of great turmoil in local government in
the United States, which resulted from a recru
descence of popular sentiment against scandal and
official corruption. The most basic popular ob
jective during this “muckraking” era was to get
rid of corruption and grafting politicians and to
“restore local government to the people.”7 As
stated in a monograph on the subject, “The
adoption of the initiative and the referendum by
almost half of the American states may be attri
buted to the Progressive movement. Few social
movements have more profoundly affected the
politics and legislation of the United States than
this movement.”8
Forming a three-pointed attack on political
corruption, the referendum, the initiative, and the
recall of public officials were utilized in the early
part of the twentieth century by those crusaders
who believed that the cure for the evils of de
6 See Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government
and Democracy (Boston, 1941), 536.
7Harold Underwood Faulkner, The Quest for Social
Justice, 1898-1914 (New York, 1931), 83-86. See also
Louis M. Hacker and Benjamin B. Kendrick, The
United States Since 1865 (New York, 1932), 417-427.
8V. O. Key, Jr., and Winston W. Crouch, The
Initiative and the Referendum in California (Berkeley,
1939), 423.
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mocracy was more democracy.9While these devices
did not succeed in completely eradicating all of
the evils at which they were directed, they did tend
to bring local government closer to the people.
On the local level at least the referendum appears
to have definitely solidified within the political
mores. As stated by one political scientist, “There
can be no doubt that the referendum is now per
manently established among the political institu
tions of the states. There is little question of
abandoning it. The only questions concerning
which there are still serious differences of opinion
relate to the form in which, and the conditions
under which, it shall be used.”10
One of the major uses of the referendum process
has been as a means of directly ascertaining the
opinion of the people in certain localities on such
matters as the sale of intoxicants, bond issues,
etc. Out of this has developed the widespread
practice of permitting local home rule concerning
liquor. In addition, city councils often have sub
mitted to the public some other controversial
matters upon which they, themselves, had not
been able to agree. It is interesting that while the
local option laws have received the approval of
the Supreme Court of the United States, the use
of the referendum on a State-wide basis usually
has been condemned as an invalid delegation of
legislative power. Size of the political area which
the referendum was made to cover thus has been
an important consideration in its use in the United
States.
As the discussion indicates, the referendum has
been utilized in the United States primarily in
State and local government.11 Until the initiation
of compulsory crop-control policies in 1934, there
had been no provision for it on the national level.
The nearest approximation to it has been the
ratification of the Federal Constitution and its
subsequent amendments; and their ratification was
by State legislatures or conventions. According to
9V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure
Groups (New York, 1942), 224-225.
10Arthur N. Holcombe, State Government in the
United States (ed. 3, New York, 1931), 551.
11 This point is emphasized by Munro in his article
on “Initiative and Referendum,” 50, when he stated
that the referendum is “an arrangement whereby
any measure which has been passed by a city council
or state legislature may under certain circumstances
be withheld from going into force until the voters
have had an opportunity to render their decision upon
it.”
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judicial theory, these were acts of “the people.”
Precisely speaking, however, the United States
has a republican form of government, in which
elected representatives function in the name of
the people. The pure democracy (for the minority
enjoying the status of full citizenship) of the Greek
city-states would undoubtedly pose insuperable
practical difficulties in twentieth-century America
—or any other large nation. In this connection it
might be pointed out that the largest area for
which the referendum (and also the initiative) has
been used is Germany. Immediately following the
first World War, direct legislation enjoyed wide
popularity in Europe. During this period the
referendum was written into the democratic post
war constitutions of a number of the continental
countries. Germany adopted the device for the
country as a whole.12
As suggested, no national legislation or govern
mental policy in the United States was determined
by a referendum prior to its use in the agricultural
adjustment program. At times, some political ob
servers have referred to a forthcoming biennial
election as constituting a referendum. In a limited
sense such an interpretation may have some mean
ing for the layman; strictly speaking, however, this
is incorrect. The biennial elections involve the
selection of public officials; these officials represent
groups of policies. The referendum, on the con
trary, solicits public opinion on a single policy.
Sometimes, indeed, it may be used to determine
the views of the people on only one particular
issue relating to that policy. Again, political elec
tions occur regularly at specified times, while
referendums take place intermittently, as the need
arises.
The Beginning of Farmer Referendums: The
Bankhead Cotton Control Act of 1934. The first
referendum among the Nation’s farmers was held
in 1935, having been provided for in the Bankhead
Cotton Control Act of 1934. Knowledge of the
origin and purposes behind this law affords helpful
insight into the relationship of the farm population
to compulsory crop-control legislation. The method
used to secure acreage reduction in the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 was essentially voluntary.
12
However, ibid., 52, states that a number of
novations were added to the referendum in Europe and
that “The complications resulting from these variations
have militated against the practical utility of the initi
ative and the referendum. In actual practice they have
been employed to a very slight extent in these coun
tries, even less than in the United States.”

Contracts agreeing to cut acreage were voluntarily
entered into by producers in the sense that no legal
compulsion was brought to bear on them. Positive
inducements, however, such as the promise of
benefit payments, etc., and an intensive publicity
or “educational” campaign helped greatly to secure
acceptance of the program.13 The result was that
the government was able to secure the cooperation
of farmers representing a large majority of the
acreage in the crops to which the program applied.14
Yet, a number of people who were most interested
in insuring the success of the experiment “were
not in all cases convinced that so-called Voluntary
methods’ of production control would prove ade
quate.”15 This uncertainty grew out of the fear
that “increased production by non-signers might
defeat the purpose of the program.”16 It was not
long before groups of producers themselves began
to demand measures which would force the less
cooperative farmers into line. Primarily as a result
of these demands from farmers, Congress, on
April 21, 1934, passed the Bankhead bill for cotton
and, on June 28, the Kerr-Smith Tobacco Control
Act.17 Thus, as stated by one writer on the subject,
“this program, like many others that have been
laid at the door of The bureaucrats’ came as much
from farmers and their organizations as from
anyone else.”18
It is significant, therefore, that the compulsory
features of the government’s farm program grew,
in large measure, out of the farmers’ own requests.
Obviously this could be expected to influence the
reception given the referendums and other AAA
policies. However, it should also be noted that
those who made their voices heard in getting
Congress to initiate compulsory control were not
primarily from the masses of rank-and-file farmers.

13In addition, conditions in agriculture had become
so bad that, as many farmers said to the writer, “We
were willing to try anything; things couldn't be much
worse.” Personal interview in Wilson County, N. C.,
January 1946.
14U. S. Agricultural Adjustment Administration,
Agricultural Adjustment, 1933 to 1935 (Washington,
1936), and Participation Under A.A.A. Programs, 193335 (Report G-91, Oct. 1938), 1-36.
15 Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of the Agri
incultural Adjustment Administration, 38-39.
16 Miriam S. Farley, Agricultural Adjustment Under
the New Deal (New York, 1936), 13.
17 U. S. Statutes at Lurge, 48: 598, 1275.
18 Charles M. Hardin, “The Tobacco Program: Ex
ception or Portent?” Journal of Farm Economics, 28:
923 (Nov. 1946).
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They were predominantly landlords and tended to
be the larger, Farm Bureau-represented farmers—
the group which traditionally has seemed to wield
the most influence in shaping the government's
agricultural policy. On the other hand, the small
farmers—the tenants and croppers—were given
equal voting privileges in the referendums, and
their strength would be necessary to carry the
program since a two-thirds majority was required
for it to go into effect.
The Bankhead Cotton Control Act set up a
compulsory control system intended to limit cotton
production to a specified quota. This was to be
achieved by levying a tax on the ginning of cotton
equal to 50 percent of the average price of the
standard grade on the 10 principal spot markets,
but not under 5 cents per pound. The small
producers, however, were given tax exemption
certificates covering their entire production—up to
5 acres in 1934 and up to 5 bales in 1935. Larger
producers were given exemption certificates in
proportion to their past performance, and certain
additional special exemptions were also allowed.
The total of all exemption certificates was not to
exceed 10 million bales in 1934; the next year the
Secretary of Agriculture set the total at 10J
million bales. The tax imposed a stiff penalty on
all production in excess of the tax-exempt allot
ments made to the individual growers. This tended
to limit total production, therefore, to approxi
mately the amount specified. The result was, as
had been intended, to force a larger number of
farmers to sign contracts. Thus “Those who had
not wished to sign up were practically forced by
the new system to give up their freedom to main
tain or expand cotton acreage on farms under
their control and, under this condition, could ill
afford to sacrifice benefit payments by refusing to
sign."19
Compulsory Control Extended to Tobacco. Since
tobacco farmers faced the same situation of danger
from the nonsigning tobacco producers, Congress
drew up a program to prevent growers who did
not participate in the voluntary program from
enjoying its financial benefits, and to expedite en
forcement of the specified obligations. The KerrSmith Tobacco Control Act of June 28, 1934
embodied this legislation. Like the Bankhead bill,
this act sought to achieve its objectives by use of
a tax. All contract signers received tax-payment
warrants equivalent to their production quotas
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under the voluntary program. Additional warrants
could be issued to growers who, for various reasons,
were ineligible to take part in a reduction pro
gram; this permitted them to maintain but not to
increase their production without having to pay
the prescribed tax. After careful study of the
administration of this act, three economists con
cluded that “While this measure created an ad
ditional incentive to producers to enter into con
tracts in order that they might secure benefit
payments, this was not a major determinant of
the size of the sign-up secured."2021 This writer's
field data confirm their view.
The First Agricultural Referendums. The Bankhead and Kerr-Smith acts were mandatory for
only one year. They were to be extended for a
second year, however, if two-thirds of the producers
of cotton or growers controlling three-fourths of
the tobacco acreage should, by referendum, ex
press a desire for their continuation. In August
1935 amendments were passed authorizing the
extension of these bills, on similar conditions, for
two additional years.21
x
Detailed rules and regulations were drawn up
for use in carrying out the referendum on the
Bankhead Act. General instructions, quite similar
to those used in regular political elections, were
issued to State allotment boards and to county and
community committeemen on November 15,
1934.22 These regulations covered every aspect of
the balloting process and set the general pattern
for the subsequent AAA referendum program
begun in 1938. As the procedure in the tobacco
referendum was generally the same as for cotton,
it will not be described here.
The County Committee of the Cotton Produc
tion Control Association (hereafter referred to as the
County Committee) was given the responsibility
of providing the facilities for holding the refer
endum in the local communities. The instructions
of November 15, 1934 specified:
The County Committee shall designate the place or
places for balloting in each local community, which

20 Ibid., 40.
21 In the fall of 1934 and 1935, referendums were
held among Corn Belt farmers to determine whether
they desired continuation of the corn-hog control pro
gram; two-thirds voted in the affirmative. Wheat grow
ers voted in favor of the wheat program in May 1935.
U. S. Agricultural Adjustment Administration, CornHog Committeemen’s Letter No. 5, Dec. 3, 1935.
19
Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of the 22 U. S. Agricultural Adjustment Administration,
Referendum on Bankhead Act, Form No. B.A. 31.
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 39.
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shall be readily accessible to all eligible voters in such
community and shall arrange by public notice for
producers to know of the time and the place for cast
ing ballots.
The County Committee shall designate three local
producers (landowners, share croppers, and/or tenants)
as the Community Referendum Committee to be in
charge of the referendum at each voting place. At least
one of these shall be a local community committeeman
of the Cotton Production Control Association. [The
committee was also ordered to provide a ballot box
and list of eligible voters.]
When the polling was completed the County
Committee was instructed to tabulate the reports
from the local communities. After certifying the
results they were to be filed with the local county
agent. The State Allotment Board would then
summarize all county reports and transmit the
certified State totals to AAA headquarters in
Washington. As a safeguard, all voted ballots, the
register, and community summary “for each
county shall be held on file under seal and in a
safe place under lock and key under supervision
of the County Agent, subject to instructions from
the Secretary of Agriculture.”
There were specific directions to be followed in
the event that any controversy developed over the
voting:
In cases of dispute over the correctness of the report
of the vote in a community, the County Committee
shall make an investigation of the vote in such com
munity not later than 12 midnight, Monday, Decem
ber 17, 1934, and the findings of the County Com
mittee shall be reported as its final findings. In each
case where a ballot is found in a sealed envelop marked
by the Community Referendum Committee “Chal
lenged” and bearing the voter’s name, the County
Committee shall, without opening the envelop, deter
mine whether or not such person is eligible to vote;
and if the Committee determines he is eligible, such
envelop shall be opened and the ballot counted in the
county summary, Form No. B.A. 35; but if the Com
mittee determines such person is not eligible to vote,
such envelop shall remain sealed and shall be preserved
with the ballots as provided in paragraph 9. In cases
of other disputes over eligibility of those voting, the
County Committee shall make an investigation, and
the findings of the Committee therein shall be reported
as its final findings.
In case of a dispute over the correctness of the report
of the vote in a county, the County Committee shall
send all ballots, register sheets, and community sum
mary sheets for such county to the State Allotment
Board by registered mail or deliver them in person.
The Board shall then make an investigation of the

report for such county not later than 12 midnight,
December 23, 1934, and the findings of the State Al
lotment Board shall be reported as its final findings.
An effort was made to insure a secret ballot by
the provision that “No member of a County
Committee shall disclose how any particular person
voted in the referendum.”
The community referendum committee, which
was to be selected by the county cotton adjustment
committee, was charged with the responsibility of
actually conducting the referendum. The duties of
this committee were to:
1. Conduct the referendum in a fair and unbiased
manner.
2. Publicly notify local producers of the time and
place for casting ballots at least 5 days in advance of
the voting day.
3. Before issuance, fill in the county and the com
munity name, number, or letter on each ballot in ink
or indelible pencil.
4. Provide ballot boxes where ballots may be de
posited by producers.
5. Provide quarters for balloting, where each pro
ducer can prepare and cast his ballot without inter
ference and without anyone seeing how he votes (but
it shall not be necessary to provide private booths).
6. Open polls at 9 a.m. on December 14, 1934.
7. Issue a ballot form to each producer who is eligible
to vote and who requests a ballot form. A copy of the
Secretary’s message is to be firmly attached to the
ballot as it is handed to each eligible voter, and should
be detached by him before he places his ballot in the
ballot box.
8. Record on Form No. B.A. 33 the name and ad
dress of the producer to whom a ballot form is issued.
9. Shall (in order that his eligibility may be finally
determined by the County Committee) permit a ballot
to be cast by any person who insists he has a right to
vote after the Community Referendum Committee has
expressed its opinion that he is not eligible to vote. In
such case the ballot shall be placed in a sealed envelop
bearing on the face of the envelop the name of the
voter so challenged and the notation “Challenged”
and thereupon such envelop shall be placed in the
ballot box and the Community Referendum Committee
shall list such challenged ballots at the foot of Form
No. B.A. 33.
10. Explain to each producer making inquiry the
procedure to follow in casting his ballot.
11. Stop issuing and receiving ballots at 5 p.m. on
December 14, 1934.
12. Promptly after closing polls, tabulate results
and record on Form No. B.A. 34.
13. Each committee member shall sign Forms Nos.
B.A. 33 and B.A. 34, certifying to their accuracy.
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14. Seal Forms Nos. B.A. 33 and B.A. 34 and all
voted, as well as unused (unmarked), ballots in en
velop (s) provided for the purpose. The chairman of
the committee shall be responsible for the sealed en
velopes) and shall deliver same to the County Com
mittee between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 12 noon of
December 15, 1934.
15. No member of a Community Referendum Com
mittee shall disclose how any particular person voted
in the referendum.
Composition of Local Committees. An important
part of the work under the adjustment program
has been carried on by these county and com
munity committees. During the early years of the
program when they were appointed by the county
agricultural agent, the agents were instructed,
according to one economist on the subject, “to
select men of character and ability who were
leaders in the county or community and in sym
pathy with the program.” This investigator found
further:
In Texas the agents were instructed to include a banker,
a business man, and a farmer in the county committee.
The county committees in ten Texas counties studied
in detail consisted of eleven bankers, ten business
men, and eleven farmers. The agents in other states
also drew heavily upon business groups for committee
members. In four counties of North and South Carolina
for which data are available, 7 of the 13 county com
mitteemen had important business interests other than
farming, only one being a banker. In four counties
studied in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi outside
of the Delta (one on the edge of the Delta), 7 of the
12 county committeemen selected had business in
terests other than farming, only two being bankers.
In the Mississippi Delta, large planters were usually
selected as county committeemen. The business men
chosen in other areas, however, commonly owned one
or more farms in the county, held farm mortgages, or
had some other direct interest in the income of particu
lar farmers or of farmers in general. The farmers se
lected usually were operators of relatively large farms,
and were practically all landowners.23
Community committeemen have usually been
farmers and seldom had any business interests
other than farming.24 Their landholdings were
generally smaller than those of the county com
mitteemen. Tenants were eligible but seldom
23Henry I. Richards, Cotton Under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act (Washington, 1934), 18-19.
24Ibid., 19; Gladys Baker, The County Agent (Chi
cago, 1939), 74-76.
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served as committeemen, and sharecroppers prac
tically never served. There has been a tendency for
the same group of committeemen to retain their
positions for long periods of time; this writer found
in his study areas that committeemen held over
from year to year, with very few exceptions. This
situation has led to a feeling on the part of most
tenants that the committee elections were meant
to be primarily landlord functions.
A message from the Secretary of Agriculture,
Henry A. Wallace, pointing up the importance of
the referendum was attached to each ballot and
was to be given to each voter. The Secretary’s
message asked the question, “Shall the Bankhead
Act Be Continued Through 1935?” and framed
this interrogation in such a way as to indicate its
significance. Mr. Wallace alluded to “a small
minority of noncooperators” and ended his state
ment with the “hope that cotton producers will
examine carefully all the facts and reach a decision
based upon considered judgment as to whether
the Bankhead Act is needed to assure the attain
ment of the objectives of the cotton adjustment
program.”
Qualifications for voting in the referendum
centered around cotton production. All persons
who had produced cotton in 1934 or who had
entered into a lease or sharecropping agreement to
grow cotton in 1935 were eligible to vote. In the
event that ownership and the present right to
produce cotton on a farm was held jointly by two
or more persons, “all of such persons shall be
entitled to vote.” Further, in case several persons,
such as husband, wife and/or children, were par
ticipating in raising cotton, it was specified that
voting would be limited to “the person or persons
who signed or entered into the lease or sharecropping agreement and thereby acquired the
legal or equitable right to produce cotton.” The
strong influence of traditional property rights on
voting eligibility can be seen plainly here.
The cotton referendum was held on December
14, 1934, under the various regulations described
above.
The AAA Referendums of 1938. With the ex
perience provided by the referendums conducted
in 1934 and 1935 under the Bankhead and KerrSmith acts (and the wheat and corn-hog measures),
the AAA launched its regular program of voting
among the Nation’s farmers in 1938. The AAA
marketing quota referendums for cotton and to
bacco were begun in March of that year. The
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>cedure for conducting them has been rather
iform and will now be described briefly.25
The Secretary of Agriculture was granted au>rity in Section 8 (1) to carry out the Agritural Adjustment Act’s declared policy “to
)vide for reduction in the acreage or reduction
the production for market or both, of any basic
ricultural commodity.” A favorable vote in
erendums among producers was necessary to
intain control. One of the first steps in the
[ding of a referendum is the issuance of a state;nt by the Secretary determining the apportion;nt and adjustment of the national and State
otas for a given commodity for the following
irketing year.26
Following this, the AAA went into action,
uing the necessary preliminary announcements,
i quote from the instructions of November 1938:
[n view of the fact that the Secretary of Agriculture
5 determined and proclaimed, pursuant to the pro
ions of Section 345 of the Agricultural Adjustment
t of 1938, that the total supply of cotton for the
58-39 marketing year exceeds by more than 7 perlt the normal supply thereof for such marketing
ir, a referendum, by secret ballot, of farmers who
re engaged in the production of cotton in 1938, will
held on December 10, 1938, pursuant to Section 347
said Act and in accordance with the regulations
rein set forth, to determine whether they favor or
pose cotton marketing quotas on the 1939 cotton
>p. Such quotas will be in effect unless more than
e-third of the farmers voting in the referendum
pose them.
Generally similar statements proclaiming narnal marketing quotas for certain other crops
d announcing forthcoming referendums of proicers have been issued from time to time since
38.
Eligibility for Voting in the Referendums. As to
»ting eligibility, the instructions governing the
ferendums were quite clear and explicit. I t was
ovided that “All farmers who were engaged in
e production of cotton in 1938” were eligible to
>te in the cotton referendum and “all farmers
10 were engaged in the production of flue-cured
25 This description is derived from the U. S. Agriculral Adjustment Administration, Instructions for Holdg Referenda on Cotton and Flue-Cured Tobacco Marketg Quotas, 39-AAA-l-A, Nov. 1938, p. 1-7.
26 For details on the formula used to determine the
;ed for tobacco quotas, see Hardin in Journal of
irm Economics, 28: 924-925.

tobacco in 1938” were eligible to vote in the
flue-cured tobacco referendum.27 Eligibility to vote
in one referendum did not entitle a farmer to take
part in the other. He could vote in both only in
the event he was engaged in the production of both
cotton and flue-cured tobacco. In addition, any
person who shared in the proceeds of the 1938
cotton crop as owner (other than a landlord of a
standing-rent or fixed-rent tenant), tenant or share
cropper was considered as having been engaged in
the production of cotton in 1938; the same was
true for tobacco. To safeguard the franchise for
those who had experienced a bad year in 1938, the
instructions provided that :
Farmers who planted cotton or flue-cured tobacco in
1938, but produced no cotton or flue-cured tobacco on
such acreage for any reason except willful neglect to
farm the planted acreage, or who made arrangements
to plant cotton or flue-cured tobacco in 1938 but were
prevented from planting by flood, excessive rainfall,
drought, or plant disease, shall be regarded as hav
ing been engaged in the production of cotton or fluecured tobacco in 1938 and therefore as eligible to vote
in the respective referendum.
The method of voting was democratic, each
voter having the same weight. Plural voting was
prohibited: “No farmer (whether an individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity) shall be entitled to more than one vote in
either referendum, even though he may have been
engaged in the production of cotton or flue-cured
tobacco in two or more communities, counties, or
States in 1938.”
The family of a producer was not eligible to
vote, it being stipulated that:
In the event several persons, such as husband, wife,
and children, participated in the production of cotton
or flue-cured tobacco in 1938 under a single rental or
cropping agreement or lease, only the person or persons
who signed or entered into the rental or cropping agree
ment or lease shall be eligible to vote.
27
Marketing quotas were not applicable to cotton
having a staple 1£ inches or more in length. Thus a
farmer raising this cotton was not eligible to vote un
less he also raised cotton with a staple less than 1J
inches in length.
Producers of the other types of tobacco (burley,
dark, air-cured, etc.) vote in separate referenda. The
bulk of tobacco farmers raise flue-cured tobacco. For a
discussion of the six major types of tobacco, see Hardin
in Journal of Farm Economics, 28: 925.
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However, if two or more persons engaged in the
production of cotton or flue-cured tobacco in
1938, not as members of a partnership but as
tenants in common, or joint tenants or as owners
of community property, each person was entitled
to vote.
In the first few referendums, voting by mail,
proxy, or agent was not permitted. However, “a
duly authorized officer of a corporation, firm,
association, or other legal entity, or a duly au
thorized member of partnership, may cast its
vote.” By 1941 voting by mail was permissible
but only under rigidly regulated conditions.
An analysis of the requirements for eligibility to
vote in the AAA referendums indicates that,
essentially, the privilege to participate necessitated
“having an interest” in the production of a given
crop. Thus the basis for participation in these
farm referendums differs considerably from that of
the usual referendums. Ordinarily a referendum
covers a particular geographic area, and all persons
of similar voting qualifications in that area may
vote. The AAA referendums, however, were largely
functional in their coverage, being concerned only
with the will of part of the farmer electorate. Only
the producers of the specified commodities or those
having a direct interest in such production had the
privilege of voting; emphasis is thus placed on
functional rather than geographic representation.
This means that not only are the people of many
entire States and regions where the products were
not grown unqualified to vote but also a large
number of people within the growing areas are
ineligible because they do not produce those com
modities. Congress thus felt that although the
referendums related to national policy and involved
to some extent the interests of the whole popula
tion, participation in the referendums should be
limited to those having a direct interest in pro
ducing the commodities concerned. This departure
from our traditional voting practices might con
ceivably be criticized by some.28 Any such criti-
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cism, however, would have to be directed at
Congress rather than the AAA, because it is not
a matter of administrative discretion but of direct
legislative policy. Functional interests usually
enter the lawmaking process at some stage anyway.
There are, however, important political aspects of
the AAA referendum process which should be kept
in mind.
Instructions to County Committees. The county
agricultural conservation committee, charged with
the responsibility “for the proper holding of the
referenda in the county,” was given detailed in
structions to follow. The first task of the com
mittee being to look after the time, place, and
notice of the referendum, it was ordered in the
instructions of November 1938 to:
Designate one readily accessible place for balloting
in each community and give public notice of the time
and place for balloting by posting the applicable notice
form at one or more places open to the public within
each community at least five days in advance of the
date of the referenda.
The AAA was concerned that the farmers be
adequately informed about the referendum. To
that end the county committee was directed to:
Make use (without advertising expense) of all avail
able agencies of public information, including news
papers and radio, to give cotton and flue-cured tobacco
farmers in the county full and accurate public notice
of the day and hours of voting, the location of polling
places, and the rules governing eligibility to vote. Such
notice should be given as soon as practicable after the
plans for holding the referenda in the county have
been made, but must be given at least five days in
advance of the date of the referenda.

The County Committee was also ordered to
designate a referendum committee of three farmers
in each AAA community, whose duty was to super
vise the actual balloting by (a) issuing ballot
forms, (b) recording votes, (c) tabulating ballots,
and (d) certifying results of the referendum in the
community.
28
In this connection, Nourse, Davis, and Black, Secrecy of Ballot Emphasized. In the first refer
Three Years of the Agricultural Adjustment Administra
endum it was recommended but not required that
tion, 274, state: “It has sometimes been objected that
these referenda were not in fact true polls of opinion the balloting be secret. Subsequently it was felt
in that they were limited to producers of the commodity desirable to make the secret ballot mandatory.
which was involved. The obvious answer to this objec The instructions sent on the eve of the second
tion is that they were not designed as general referenda referendum, December 1938, ordered the county
on the question whether or not adjustment efforts
should be undertaken but as expressions of opinion by They explain further that “the larger question of
the interested parties as to whether they desired to national agricultural policy was answered by Congress”
continue or as to what methods should be employed.” in the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
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committee to “see that appropriate measures be
taken to insure that each referendum is conducted
by secret ballot.”29 These instructions were also
passed on to the community referendum commit
tees. The regulations issued October 31, 1941 were
even more explicit on the matter of secrecy.
Section 7 (a) provided:
The voting in the referendum shall be by secret
ballot. Each voter shall, at the time he is handed the
form on which to cast his ballot, be instructed to mark
his ballot form so as to indicate clearly how he votes
and in such manner that no one else shall see how he
votes and then to fold his ballot and place it in the
ballot box without allowing anyone else to see how he
voted. A suitable place where each voter may mark and
cast his ballot in secret and without coercion, duress,
or interference of any sort whatever shall be provided
in each polling place. Every unchallenged ballot shall
be placed in the ballot box by the person who voted it.
The fact that a voter fails to fold a ballot placed in
the ballot box shall not invalidate it. It shall be the
duty of each community referendum committee to see
that no device of any sort whatever is used whereby
any voter’s ballot may be identified (except as provided
in these regulations in the case of a challenged ballot
or a ballot cast by mail).30
As in the case of the original referendum under
the Bankhead Act, regulations covering subsequent
referendums made adequate provisions for investi
gating and settling controversies which might
arise.
The AAA referendum program made con
siderable use of “economic democratic machinery/,
as the local organizations were often called.31 The
first duty of the community referendum committee
was to arrange “for conducting the referenda by
secret ballot.” Next it had the task of assisting the
county committee in seeing that “adequate public
notice of the time and place” of the voting was
given. Secrecy was again emphasized by Section
C-3 of the instructions to community referendum
committees which required them to “provide a
place where each eligible farmer can prepare and
cast a ballot in secret and without interference.”
29 Nevertheless, the writer’s field interviews revealed
that referendum voting was often quite informal, many
farmers showing no interest in keeping their vote
secret.
30 U. S. Agricultural Adjustment Administration,
Regulations Governing the Holding of Referenda on Mar
keting Quotas, MZ-650, Oct. 31, 1941, p. 4.
31 Henry A. Wallace, Planning Ahead under the AAA
(U. S. Department of Agriculture, Press Release 8951,
Sept. 1934), 2.

Section C-6 reiterated the AAA’s desire for free
and secret voting by ordering the community
committee to “hold the referenda in a fair and
unbiased manner and see that appropriate meas
ures are taken to insure that the referenda are
conducted by secret ballot.” Going beyond this,
the committee’s instructions of November 1938
further were:
See that no device is used whereby any voter’s bal
lot may be identified (except in the case of a chal
lenged ballot). Instruct each voter, as he is handed a
ballot form, as to the procedure to be followed in cast
ing his ballot and instruct him to fold his ballot before
he places it in the ballot box after he has marked
it___
The hours of voting in the referendums were
usually from 9 a.m. until about 5 p.m., after which
the ballot boxes were opened and the ballots
canvassed. The canvassing of ballots was always
to be “kept open to the public.” After the ballots
were counted, recorded on specified forms,, and
their accuracy certified, the referendum commit
tee’s work ended with the delivery of the sealed
ballots and executed forms to the County Com
mittee. The State committee was given the job of
summarizing the county referendum returns and
forwarding them to the Agricultural Adjustment
Administrator in Washington, where the “final and
official tabulation of votes cast” was made by the
AAA and the results of the referendum announced
by the Secretary of Agriculture. The State com
mittee also was required to:
Complete the investigation of any report from any
county regarding controversies, irregularities, or the
correctness of summaries of the referenda, not later
than seven calendar days after the date of the refer
enda, and forward its findings in such cases to the
applicable regional director.
These referendums have been carried out so
smoothly and efficiently, however, that this pro
vision has seldom been utilized.
Since 1938 several marketing quota referendums
have been held among producers of cotton, to
bacco, and several other crops under the general
administrative conditions described above. The
referendum process has been found to be generally
satisfactory and has become an important method
of ascertaining the opinion of farmers on crop
control. It is interesting to observe how different
the use of the referendum device has been in
Europe and America during recent years. At the
very time the referendum was being utilized for
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the purpose of attempting to extend and strengthen
democracy in the United States, European dic
tators were wielding it to weaken democratic
institutions and to consolidate their authoritarian
dictatorships. Technically the voting in Europe
concerned changes in the sovereignty of given
territories and peoples and to be more precise,
therefore, were called plebiscites. Essentially, how
ever, “A plebiscite is, literally, a popular refer
endum on any question.”32
The close relationship of the referendum to
popular political institutions was expressed by
Henry A. Wallace when as Secretary of Agri
culture he said that the referendums were “in line
with the democratic principles under which this
Government is founded.” As a matter of fact,
many people became convinced very early that the
referendum process, and the accompanying pro
gram of utilizing local committees of farmers,
started us as Wallace said “on our way toward a
true economic democracy, designed to rescue our
political democracy from the danger of becoming
a hollow mockery.”33
Constitutional Aspects of the A A A . The Agri
cultural Adjustment Act raised interesting ques
tions of constitutional and administrative law as
well as rather important political considerations.
Like a number of other basic New Deal measures,
notably the National Industrial Recovery Act and
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act (commonly
referred to as the Guffey Coal Act), this act
provided for the participation of private or un
official groups in its administration and also certain
discretion on the part of those charged with
carrying it out. As Congress has found it necessary
to legislate on increasingly complex economic prob
lems, “it has seemed expedient to invoke the
assistance of interested parties, familiar with the
minutiae upon which specific rules must be based
and competent to pass judgment upon the efficacy
of such regulations.”34
The constitutional issues resulting from this
situation center around such problems as the
delegation of legislative authority, administrative
32 Sarah Wambaugh, “Plebiscite,” Encyclopaedia of
the Social Sciences, 12:163 (New York, 1934).
33Wallace, Planning Ahead under the AAA, 1. The
local manifestations of this machinery of “economic
democracy” and the attitudes and action patterns
which crystallized around it are important considera
tions of the writer’s study of participation in the AAA.
34 “Delegation of Power to Private Parties,” Columbia
Law Review, 37: 448 (Mar. 1937).

43

discretion, and the extent to which private groups
may legitimately participate in the administration
of regulatory legislation carrying penalties. The
matter of delegation of power to executive or ad
ministrative officers and agencies usually has been
construed by the courts on the basis of whether a
definite and adequate “rule” or “standard” for
executive guidance was laid down by the statute,
and whether checks to administrative discretion—
such as the right of appeal—were provided. The
National Industrial Recovery Act was voided by
the Supreme Court on the ground, among others,
that the powers delegated to the President were
“unfettered” or “unconfined and vagrant,” going
far beyond the bounds that a clear standard would
have imposed.35 Judicial construction of cases in
volving delegations to unofficial groups, however,
has not been grounded on any similarly consistent,
even if sometimes vague, principle such as “definite
standards.”36 Instead, “a variety of ostensibly
unrelated rationales” have been utilized, “with a
tendency to employ tests which vary with the type
of statute examined.”37
A rather common type of delegation to private
parties is the submission of a statute to the elec
torate for its approval—the basic referendum
process. In the majority of cases, the courts have
held, in the absence of a constitutional provision
for a referendum, that submission of a proposal to
all the State’s voters is an illegal delegation of
legislative authority.38
35Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, in 293 U. S. 388,
421 (1935); and Schechter v. United States, in 295
U. S. 495, 529-542 (1935).
36 On the problems involved in judicial construction
of the Constitution and the broad discretion per
mitted the Court in considering major questions of
constitutionality, see Edward S. Corwin, The Twilight
of the Supreme Court (New Haven, 1934), especially
180—184; and Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for
Judicial Supremacy (New York, 1941), especially 86235.
Determination of when standards are sufficiently
“clear and definite” is no easy task. See Louis L. Jaffe,
“Law Making by Private Groups,” Harvard Law
Review, 51: 201-253 (Dec. 1937), especially p. 214.
37 “Delegation of Power to Private Parties,” Co
lumbia Law Review, 37:448.
38People ex rel Thompson v. Barnett, in 344 Illinois
62, 176 N. E. 108 (1931). See also Westel Woodbury
Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States
(ed. 2, New York, 1929), 224-226.
On the use of referendums in local government, see
Walter F. Dodd, State Government (ed. 2, New York,
1928), 524-535.
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Some justices, however, have made notable
dissents, one holding that this device was “an
important adjunct to democratic government: it
tests the readiness of the people and the likeli
hood of enforceability.” Expressing the same point
of view, Justice Holmes once declared that “the
contrary view seems to me an echo of Hobbes’
theory that the surrender of Sovereignty by the
people was final.”39 On the other hand, local
option laws, which are presented to the voters of
smaller political areas and which deal with purely
local matters, have been upheld.40 The state-wide
referendum was considered to be an abdication of
legislative functions, while the local option laws
were seen as “contingencies” upon which the act of
the legislature is to take effect. This judicial
distinction is regarded by some observers as rather
weak and tenuous because the legality of the
statute, on both State and local levels, is con
ditionally dependent upon a favorable reception
by the voters, and since in both situations a
legislative function is performed by the electorate.
They believe that the test of “contingency” should
be strengthened by the use of a definite principle—
one which determined whether the given body of
voters specified in the statute is substantially the
sole group affected by the action, and is adequately
informed of the necessity for the legislation to be
competent to pass judgment as to its desirability.
This, it is concluded, would bring state-wide
referendums within the pale of constitutionality
where the legislation presented to the voters is of
“general” concern. This assumes that inhabitants
are best able to dispose of, and are alone seriously
affected by, local matters.
The Supreme Court of the United States passed
on the constitutionality of the delegation of power
to private groups made in the Guffey Coal Act. In
this case,41 the court considered the provisions of
the act which enabled part of the operators and
miners—the latter represented by the union—to
enter into agreements fixing maximum hours and
minimum wages for the entire industry. The court
declared that control of a minority by a competing
majority was “legislative delegation in its most
39 This statement and the preceding are quoted by
Jaffe in Harvard Law Review, 51: 222.
40State ex rel McLeod v. Harvey, in 170 So. 153
(Fla. 1936). Other cases are cited in the Yale Law
Journal, 41:134, n. 15-17 (Nov. 1931).
41Carter v. Carter Coal Company, in 298 U. S. 238,
311 (1936).

obnoxious form.” In the Guffey Coal Act, Congress
specified the sanctions for violation of the law
whatever it might be; the precise content, however,
was to be worked out in part by private parties.
This, the court held, was a “governmental func
tion” and delegating it to private bodies consti
tuted “clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.. . . ”
The original Agricultural Adjustment Act re
quired neither group initiative nor participation,
although it authorized the Secretary of Agri
culture to utilize producers and producer asso
ciations in the administration of the act. Section
10b of the act provided that “The Secretary of
Agriculture is authorized to establish, for the more
effective administration of the functions vested in
him by this title, State and local committees, or
associations of producers . . . when in his judgment
they are qualified to do so, to act as agents of their
members and patrons in connection with the distri
bution of rental or benefit payments.”
Two types of programs were carried on under
this act. First, benefit payments were made to
farmers who agreed to reduce their crop acreage.
Formally, this was a program of voluntary par
ticipation—at least in a legal sense. The early crop
restriction programs were not subject to the vote
of the farmers, but in drafting the plan farm
organizations were consulted regularly. At the end
of the first year, the question of continuing acreage
control was put to a vote of the producers who
gave it a heavy majority.
The other program provided for by the act was
a series of “licenses” and “marketing agreements.”
These were compulsory schemes but applied only
to the marketing of the minor crops—fruits, vege
tables, and dairy products. They controlled the
activities of growers and handlers. A total quota
for market was usually set and prorated among
growers and handlers. Such matters as terms and
practices and, at times, the price to the producer,
were fixed. I t was administrative practice to
consult producer representatives (cooperatives
were usually dominant) before drawing up the
regulations. The proposed regulations were then
discussed at public hearings and, before going into
effect, were submitted to producers for their
approval.42
The participation of producers in carrying out
42
Processors and handlers apparently were not
generally polled. See Jaffe in Harvard Law Review,
51:238.
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the agricultural adjustment program was quite
important, as pointed out in the discussion of the
county and community committees. Administra
tion of the benefit payment plans, fixing of quotas
for individual farmers, checking on compliance
with allotments, and other duties were performed
by these local farmer committees. I t appears that
these county associations had no legislative or rulemaking functions. None of the decisions of these
committees were final, appeal to the higher State
and Federal authorities being possible.43
Perhaps of even greater importance was the
participation of interested private groups in the
administration of the licenses and marketing agree
ments. Their participation was not provided for in
the statute itself, but was usual administrative
practice.44 Sometimes boards, elected by growers
and packers, were authorized to estimate market
demand, to fix quotas for handlers, and to control
prices. Their rulings were subject to disapproval
by the Secretary of Agriculture. When the Agri
cultural Adjustment Act was amended in 1935,
the principle of producer and handler approval was
adopted formally. However, the compulsory pro
gram could not be made effective unless the
“Secretary of Agriculture determines that the
issuance of such order is approved or favored” by
at least two-thirds of the growers in number or
volume of the product to be put under quotas.45
The Supreme Court has passed on constitutional
aspects of the revised AAA program in several im
portant cases. In two of these cases,46 it held a
very liberal view as to how clear and definite must
be the legislative standards or criteria under
which Congress may delegate legislative power to
executive officers. The cases involved action of the
Secretary of Agriculture under the statute regu
lating the marketing of milk in the urban areas
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of New York and Boston respectively. The Secre
tary was given broad powers to carry out the
purposes of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act of 1937; the only restriction on his actions was
the declaration of policy in the act which says:
“to establish and maintain such orderly marketing
conditions for agricultural commodities in inter
state commerce as will establish prices to farmers
at a level that will give agricultural commodities
a purchasing power with respect to articles that
farmers buy equivalent to the purchasing power of
agricultural commodities in the base period [19091914].”47
To carry out this policy, the Secretary was
authorized to enter into agreements with producers
and handlers of agricultural products, to establish
uniform prices to be paid to producers by handlers
of milk, to stabilize prices received by producers,
etc. I t was alleged that this act unconstitutionally
delegated legislative power to the Secretary of
Agriculture. Objection was also made to subsection
19 which provided that, for the purpose of de
termining whether the issuance of an order is
approved, the “Secretary may conduct a refer
endum among producers.” This, it was charged,
was an unlawful delegation to producers of the
legislative power to put an order into effect in a
market. A majority of the court, however, de
clared that the basic policy of restoring “parity
prices” was a sufficiently adequate guide to the
Secretary’s discretion to meet the allegation of
invalid delegation. As to the producer referendum,
Justice Reed, speaking for the court in the Rock
Royal Case, stated that “in considering this ques
tion, we must assume that the Congress had the
power to put this order into effect without the
approval of anyone. Whether producer approval by
election is necessary or not, a question we reserve,
43 However, their views must have had considerable a requirement of such approval would not be an
weight in Washington. The correspondence of the invalid delegation.”
An attack on the validity of the Agricultural
Secretary of Agriculture in the National Archives
shows that when the Secretary received a complaint Adjustment Act of 1938 arose under the sections
from a farmer the first step was usually to refer him to providing for the establishment of marketing
his county committee.
quotas for flue-cured tobacco. (There are similar
^Harold B. Rowe, Tobacco Under the AAA (Wash
sections dealing with cotton, corn, wheat, and
ington, 1935), 100-105, 112-113.
4549 Stat. 753 (1935), 7 U. S. C. A. Sec. 608c (8-9). rice.) An injunction was sought by certain pro
The approval of only 50 percent of the handlers is ducers who exceeded their quotas to prevent local
sought, but it may be dispensed with if the Secretary warehousemen from deducting the 50 percent
finds urgency.
penalties provided for under the act from the sale
46 United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, in 307 of the amount of tobacco in excess of the assigned
U. S. 533 (1939); and Hood and Sons v. United States,
47 50 Stat. 246 (1937), 7 U. S. C. A. Sec. 602 (1).
ibid., 588.
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quotas.48 The appellants alleged that the act was
unconstitutional on the ground, as outlined by
Justice Roberts, “ (1) that the act is a statutory
plan to control agricultural production and, there
fore, beyond the powers delegated to Congress;
(2) that the standard for calculating farm quotas
is uncertain, vague, and indefinite, resulting in an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to
the Secretary; (3) that, as applied to the appellants’
1938 crop, the act takes their property without due
process of law.”
The Supreme Court held that the statute did not
attempt to control production. “It sets no limit
upon the acreage which may be planted or pro
duced and imposes no penalty for the planting and
producing of tobacco in excess of the marketing
quota. I t purports to be solely a regulation of
interstate commerce, which it reaches and effects
at the throat where tobacco enters the stream of
commerce,—the marketing warehouse.” On the
second point, the Court declared that “definite
standards are laid down for the government of
the Secretary, first, in fixing the quota and,
second, in its allotment amongst states and farms.”
Continuing, the Court pointed out:
He is directed to adjust the allotments so as to allow
for specified factors which have abnormally affected
the production of the state or the farm in question in
the test years. Certainly fairness requires that some
such adjustment shall be made. The Congress has
indicated in detail the considerations which are to be
held in view in making these adjustments, and, in
order to protect against arbitrary action, has afforded
both administrative and judicial review to correct er
rors. This is not to confer unrestrained arbitrary power
on an executive officer. In this respect the act is valid
within the decisions of this court respecting delegation
to administrative officers.
Regarding the third issue, the majority opinion
stated that the argument of the appellants “over
looks the circumstance that the statute operates
not on farm production, as the appellants insist,
but upon the marketing of their tobacco in inter
state commerce.”
The revised AAA program thus has withstood
the ordeal of judicial construction. As presently
interpreted and administered, there appears to be
no serious question of constitutionality. There are,
however, important political considerations which
should be discussed in connection with the act.
Political Implications of the Referendum Process.
48 Midford v. Smith, in 307 U. S. 38 (1939).

A basic question may arise in the minds of some
as to the wisdom and propriety of utilizing the
referendum process. In systems of democratic
control, the machinery through which the control
is made effective is patently of great concern. Is it
wise to permit functional groups to participate in
the administration of important economic legisla
tion of this sort? May the referendums be construed
as a situation in which “farmers vote programs for
themselves” ? In short, what may be the conse
quences of permitting private functional groups to
participate in the governmental process of policy
determination?
Technically, producer participation under the
AAA referendum process does not raise as serious
legal and political issues as did some of the other
New Deal legislation alluded to, for the groups
concerned in the AAA did not have the function of
initiation. They voiced their acceptance or nonacceptance of a situation; they did not make it.
The Secretary of Agriculture determined the need
for and size of the quota. He, in the opinion of the
Supreme Court, was guided by satisfactorily defi
nite standards in exercising his discretion. More
over, some courts have considered group initiation
and participation to be permissible—when pro
vision is made for the concurrence by the ad
ministrative official in the terms of the regula
tions.49 This would appear to be logical and fair,
since provision for appeal from local decisions
seems to satisfy the necessary requirements of due
process.
Federal agricultural policy requires a vote of
ratification by interested producers before a control
program or marketing plan can become effective.
In certain cases, this obviously might, by giving it
the use of coercive sanction, increase the power of
the dominant group. It should also be remembered
that a veto may not be of very much use without
leadership and effective organization—attributes
which inferior groups, such as croppers, usually do
not have. But even with these limitations on the
value of democratic procedures, it should not be
forgotten that the franchise provides even the un
organized groups—who may in some instances be
a majority—an opportunity they would not other49
Agricultural Prorate Committee v. Supreme Court,
in 5 Cal. (ed. 2) 550; 55 P. (2d) 495 (1936); United
States v. Edwards, 14 F. Supp. 384 (S. D. Cal. 1936).
In these cases, the legislation was held constitutional
without passing on the question specifically. See Jaffe
in Harvard Law Review, 51: 238, n. 1.

REFERENDUM PROCESS IN AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS

wise possess. The weaker elements of a functional
group might face a situation in which it is necessary
for them to accept some program, but they might
be able to secure concessions otherwise unob
tainable; awareness of them might conceivably
affect the original drafting of the program.
To those who might feel inclined to question the
AAA program’s bringing private groups into policy
formulation at this stage, it might be pointed out
that the entrance of interest groups into this
function is quite usual under our system of govern
ment. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the
function of the private groups at this point is
acceptance rather than initiation. It seems inevi
table that they bring their influence to bear at
some stage of the legislative and administrative
processes. Recognizing their existence formally,
Congress now requires the registration of lobbyists
in Washington. If they fail or have only limited
success at one stage, they rejoin the attack at the
next; and usually this sustained pressure gets
results. Can it be that the particular time or stage
at which they assert themselves is of transcending
importance? One student of the subject has pointed
out that “in practice the initiative and referendum
have been used by various organized groups that
have been unable to obtain or to block desired
action by the legislature.” And this, he concluded
without alarm, “is, of course, not a matter for
surprise, since the same organized groups furnish
the activating force in the ordinary legislative
process.”50*
50 Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 225.
See also Jaffe in Harvard Law Review, 51: 252.
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Indeed, some students of government are con
vinced that the real nature of modern society
cannot be clearly understood unless analyzed in
terms of the impact of pluralistic forces on the
legal and political institutions.61 I t may be that
the referendum has possibilities of helping to meet
part of the criticism aimed at contemporary society
—and without seriously disturbing our basic tra
ditional institutions and political ideals. A central
idea of the political theory of some writers has been
that the consent of those affected by law is needed
in order to give it moral sanction and effective
enforceability and that our present political organ
isms do not for this purpose place representation
on a sufficiently realistic and equitable basis.52
From this point of view, the open participation of
functional groups in the governmental process
might be considered to represent a desirable de
velopment in the evolution of our political insti
tutions. It may help to make public administration
both more effective and more democratic. Certainly
these are desirable goals, especially in a fastmoving era requiring increasingly complex action
programs by the government.
51 See Francis W. Coker, “Pluralism,” in Charles E.
Merriam and Harry Elmer Barnes, History of Political
Theories (New York, 1924), 111, and the same author’s
“Pluralism” in Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, 12:
170-173 (New York, 1934); Harold J. Laski, Studies in
Law and Politics (New Haven, 1932), 244-246, and
Foundations of Sovereignty (New York, 1921), 232-249.
52 See the writings of Harold J. Laski; Jaffe, in
Harvard Law Review, 51:210-212; and Ernest S.
Griffith, The Impasse of Democracy (New York, 1939),
especially 128-140.

